

TOWARD A UNIQUE/USEFUL CONCEPT OF VALUES  
FOR INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR:  
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON VALUE

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*Summary.*—The concept of values has been defined differently within each discipline in the social sciences and many different methods have been proposed to measure individual values. For the purpose of deriving a *unique* concept of values it was necessary to distinguish values from other related concepts. This was accomplished by viewing values as evaluative dimensions, e.g., good-bad, desirable-undesirable, shoulds and oughts. Since the focus of this paper is not on values for values' sake, the value literature was critically examined in order to suggest the value concepts, value lists, and instrument methodologies which are expected to be *useful* for explaining, predicting, or changing behavior; specifically, interpersonal behavior. The paper concludes by systematically summarizing the research issues that need to be addressed, i.e., uniqueness and usefulness, if social scientists are to further substantive knowledge about values and behavior.

The concept of values has received attention in every discipline in the social sciences. Economics defines value in terms of the market price of goods and services. Anthropology uses the notion of value to describe dominant cultural patterns and cultural themes. Political science states values via desirable ingredients of political goals. History uses values to analyze historical events and sequences. Philosophy discusses the role of values in the underlying processes of human behavior and existence. Sociology utilizes the concept of values in explaining social action. Psychology explores the learning of values and the effect of individual values on cognitive and affective behavior; see Williams (1968) for a brief review of use of value.

While the concept of values enters into all aspects of social science, it is apparent that the various disciplines have used the term with varying meanings. Pepper (1958) has indicated that values have been defined as interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions and attractions, and many other types of selective orientation. Baier (1969, pp. 35-36) has listed several of the popular definitions of values to show the great variety of meanings:

a thing has or is a value if and when people behave toward it so as to retain or increase their possession of it. (George Lundberg)

Anything capable of being appreciated (wished for) is a value. (Robert Part and E. W. Burgess)

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Values are the obverse of motives . . . the object, quality, or condition that satisfies the motivation. (Richard T. LaPiere)

Values are any object of any need. (Howard Becker)

A desideratum or anything desired or chosen by someone, at sometime—operationally: what the respondent says he wants. (Stuart C. Dodd)

By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity. (Znaniecki)

[A value is] a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available means and ends of action. (Clyde Kluckhohn)

"Values" : = : "the desirable end states which act as a guide to human endeavor or the most general statements of legitimate ends which guide social action." (Neil J. Smelser)

The noun 'value' has usually been used to imply some code or standard which persists through time and provides a criterion by which people order the intensities of desiring various desiderata. To the extent that people are able to place objects, actions, ways of life, and so on, on a continuum of approval-disapproval with some reliability, it appears that their responses to a particular desideratum are functions of culturally acquired values. (William R. Catton, Jr.)

"Values" : = : "normative standards by which human beings are influenced in their choice among the alternative courses of action which they perceive." (Philip E. Jacob and James J. Flink)

In his review of the different meanings assigned to "value," Tisdale (1961) suggested the following summary definition of value:

Values are inferred motivational constructs associated with perceived differences in goal-directed behavior and indicated by the selection of action-alternatives within social situations.

Ehrlich and Wiener (1961) in their consideration of the various definitions of values listed five aspects that they saw as encompassing these definitions. These are (a) an affective dimension, (b) desirability in terms of long-range preferences or preferable alternatives in a given situation, (c) that values can be implicit or explicit, (d) a tendency to determine directionality of behavior, and (e) relationships to means and goals of action.

#### DEFINING VALUES

The foregoing definitions and summaries of value concepts certainly suggest the loose manner in which this concept has been utilized in the social sciences. What seems of primary importance is that however the concept comes to be defined in a given discipline or interdisciplinary study, it should be differentiated from other "neighboring" concepts. A value defined as interests, needs, motives, preferences, desires, etc., does not suggest why an additional concept termed "value" is required. It is proposed that the concept be defined and utilized where it can hope to add to the conceptual and empiri-

cal analysis of social behavior, and therefore the concept must be unique, concrete, operational, and empirically testable, and hence, it must be useful.

Looking back to the several definitions of value that were presented, it seems that "values" might be most uniquely defined vis-à-vis a set of *evaluative* dimensions. For example, some evaluative dimensions are: good-bad, right-wrong, desirable-undesirable, appropriate-inappropriate, shoulds and oughts. These dimensions are not necessarily reflected in concepts such as needs, motives, interests, and preferences. Other concepts that utilize evaluative dimensions are "norms" and "normative statements." While these concepts clearly contain evaluative dimensions via prescriptions, shoulds and oughts, it seems useful to view values as not subject to situational changes. That is, while norms are specific to a particular context, values can be conceptualized as more general oughts that transcend any one context. For example, the value of honesty can be applied to many norms in different situations.

At this time distinctions will be drawn between values (as encompassing evaluative dimensions) and other related concepts in the social sciences. The set of concepts of *needs, desires, wants, motives, and wishes* all refer to an individual being in a state of some deficiency or tension and focusing on the reduction of the deficiency or tension (or in some cases to increase the level of tension). Values, on the other hand, might suggest what an individual *ought* to need, desire, want, etc. This ought is guided by what is perceived as good-bad, right-wrong, desirable-undesirable, regardless of what the individual feels deficient about. Values have an affect on needs and these related concepts only by having conditioned or reinforced the need. As Kluckhohn (1951) has stated: "A given value may have a strength that is relatively independent of any particular motive, though it remains in some sense a function of the total motivational system" (p. 425).

Another set of concepts has often been discussed as if they were values. These are *interests, preferences, goals, and valances* (Smith, 1963). These concepts all suggest that some object in the social or physical environment of an individual has taken on special meaning or has become a focus of attention. The term cathexis is often used to express the process or state whereby an individual gets "attached" to some object. Values can be seen to differ from these in that values would state what goal, interest, preference, etc., an individual should focus on. This "should" is based on the dimensions of good-bad, desirable-undesirable, etc.

*Norms and normative statements* are concepts that suggest what an individual should or should not do in a specific situation. Values, as has been suggested, are seen as fairly independent from any one context. As Williams (1968) states: "Values, as standards (criteria) for establishing what should be regarded as desirable, provide the grounds for accepting or rejecting particular

norms." While some norms may be so general as to approach values, in most cases it is probably not too difficult to distinguish between a given norm and the more encompassing value or values that support the norm.

Personality concepts such as individual *dispositions*, *traits*, and *tendencies* can also be distinguished from a specific concept of values. These concepts refer to the relatively stable characteristics of an individual that guide his behavior and can be used to describe his actions over varying situations. Values which relate to these concepts would state that a particular trait or disposition is good or bad, right or wrong, i.e., one ought to have such a disposition. In other words, there is a difference between indicating what disposition or trait can be used to describe an individual, as opposed to stating what disposition or trait is seen as desirable (a value).

A final set of concepts to be differentiated from values are *beliefs*, *attitudes*, *sentiments*, and *opinions*. These concepts relate to convictions and feelings that individuals have about social and physical phenomena. For example, "I believe that . . . , It is my opinion that . . . , I feel that . . ." Only when these statements are followed by oughts, shoulds, goods, and bads, etc., can it be said that a value is being expressed. Otherwise, such statements simply describe, state, or test the reality of a phenomenon.

The foregoing attempt to differentiate a specific concept of values from other related concepts suggests the many ways in which values as evaluative dimensions can be present in human behavior. Values can be guides to what needs, wants, desires people should have, what interests, preferences, and goals are seen as desirable or undesirable, what individual dispositions or traits one ought to have, and what beliefs and attitudes individuals should express.

#### *A Focus on Values: Interpersonal Behavior*

It was decided to focus on a concept of values that is specifically relevant to interpersonal behavior since it was felt that values become substantially concrete and operational at the interpersonal level of analysis. The discussions and critical analysis in this paper, however, may also be relevant to other behavioral settings, e.g., organizational behavior, societal behavior, or behavior in general. The important point is that concepts are not explored and analyzed simply for the sake of the concept, e.g., values for values sake. Rather, the concept of values, as in the present case, is explored to further our understanding of some form of *behavior*: the explanation of behavior, its prediction, or in order to change behavior. The focus on interpersonal behavior was chosen, therefore, not only for the stated reason but simply to address some specified realm of behavior. Without such a focus, it is unlikely that a useful concept of values will emerge that does further the development of substantive knowledge for explaining, predicting, and/or changing human action. For present purposes, "interpersonal behavior" is defined as behavior among people, either

dyadic or several people, regarding a variety of concerns and objectives, but not large group, organizational, or societal behavior. The latter can be addressed vis-à-vis values in some further study.

Because the present study is concerned with developing a concept of values that is specifically relevant to interpersonal behavior, it is worthwhile to consider how to focus on a unique concept for this area of investigation. In particular, what type of oughts and shoulds would be expected to affect significant aspects of interpersonal behavior?

It seems that values which would affect interpersonal *behavior* in a significant manner are values that specify how one ought to *behave* in various situations. This type of value focus is in contrast to other possible types of values. For example, values are excluded that suggest what motives individuals should have when they interact with other individuals. Also excluded are values which indicate what interests or attitudes are appropriate for interpersonal encounters. The concept which the "values of behavior" emphasize is probably best viewed as traits, dispositions, or tendencies relevant to interpersonal situations.

Rokeach (1969) distinguishes between instrumental values versus terminal values. The former are defined as specific modes of conduct that are personally or socially preferable (desirable) to alternative modes of conduct. The latter are analogously defined via end-states of existence. Rokeach's notion of instrumental values is quite similar to generalized long-range goals. *Instrumental values* will thus be taken as a reference for focusing on a concept of values specific to interpersonal behavior. This is consistent with the "values of behavior" relating to individual traits, dispositions, and tendencies, the concepts by which modes of behavior are typically described.

#### *Criteria for a Literature Focus*

Along with the many definitions of values that social science literature has generated, several concrete lists of values that reflect these definitions have been proposed and measured. These lists of values are either derived from some theoretical classification or found from an empirical investigation of some value concept. Often, a given value list is factor analyzed to uncover the basic dimensions of the list.

Since this paper is concerned with the furtherment of substantive knowledge of values in relation to interpersonal behavior, this review will discuss these value lists according to their uniqueness and expected usefulness to this area. Also, the definition of values that guided the various studies will be compared to the particular focus of values proposed in the previous section, i.e., values as evaluative dimensions. Furthermore, attention will be given to identifying value lists that are suitable for an empirical investigation of values in an interpersonal setting. Some attention will also be directed to con-

sidering the clusters of factors underlying particular value lists. These guides to reviewing the literature are aimed toward selecting instruments specific to "values of behavior" in interpersonal settings to foster useful empirical research in this field. This paper will conclude with a two-by-two matrix which will summarize the following researched value lists according to whether or not the concepts of values are unique, i.e., are assessed as evaluative dimensions, or are useful, i.e., are concrete, instrumental values versus vague, terminal values. In essence, this paper is emphasizing the category of unique *and* useful concepts of values. Thus, only those studies are reviewed which explicitly address a definition of values, contain a list of values, and propose some method or instrument for actually assessing individuals on the proposed list of values, so that the relationship between values and interpersonal behavior can be empirically investigated.

#### SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW ON VALUE LISTS

Five basic methods have been utilized to assess an individual's values: (a) rank ordering (e.g., Catton, 1954; Hunt, 1935; Rokeach, 1969) or via Q-sort (e.g., Gorlow & Barocas, 1964, 1965; Gorlow & Noll, 1967); (b) paired-comparisons or forced choice (e.g., Allport & Vernon, 1931; Catton, 1954); (c) coding of open-ended questions (e.g., Scott, 1959; Smith, 1949); (d) attitude scaling (e.g., Lurie, 1937; Morris, 1956; Rettig & Pasamanick, 1959; Van Dusen, 1939; Woodruff & DiVesta, 1948); and (e) projective scaling (Kilmann, 1975).

The most well known and researched set of value lists is that by Allport and Vernon (1931) and later revised by Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey (1951). Taking from the six types of men which Spranger theoretically defined by their different "evaluative attitudes," Allport and Vernon devised a forced-choice questionnaire to assess the six types of value orientations. These value orientations are: Social, Theoretical, Aesthetic, Religious, Political, and Economic. Summaries of research using this value instrument ("A Study of Values") are given by Duffy (1940) and Dukes (1955).

Allport, *et al.* defined their concept of value according to what type of orientation an individual *prefers* to other orientations. This way of viewing values does not distinguish values from descriptive preferences or interests. Scott (1959) in his consideration of value instruments stated the following: "The Allport-Vernon scale appears more like a test of object-preferences than a test of personal values in the present sense; most of the items do not require moral evaluation of courses of action, but simply selection among them." In other words, the "Study of Values" does not involve evaluative dimensions in any aspect of the assessment. Therefore, it is not expected that this instrument would measure the unique concept of value that has been discussed, nor does it seem that this instrument is useful for interpersonal settings.

Several attempts have been made to validate empirically the notion of Spranger's six types of value orientations. Lurie (1937) performed a comprehensive factor analysis on 144 items, 24 corresponding to each of Spranger's types. Four main factors were extracted: Social, Philistine (a combination of economic and political), Theoretical, and Religious. Three minor factors were: Openmindedness, Practicality, and Aesthetic. This analysis gives some support for the Allport, *et al.* Study of Values Test with some modifications. Van Dusen, *et al.* (1939) used five of the Lurie factors (the four major ones and Aesthetic) to develop a standardized values inventory. This test, however, has not received much research attention. Using the actual items of the Allport, *et al.* test, Duffy and Crissy (1940) empirically chose three factors; Brogden (1952) chose 11 factors.

While the Allport, *et al.* test has received by far the most investigation, the very general nature of the six value orientations makes the link between these orientations and actual interpersonal behavior difficult to conceptualize. As Duker (1955) indicates, the many studies using this test have primarily been uncritical of what the instrument was actually measuring. In his discussion of research results, Cook (1966) states, "The Study of Values may not, in fact, be a pure measure of values, but rather a mixture of interests and values. Even so, it seems to represent the nearest approximation of a test of values that is now available" (p. 80). For interpersonal relationships, however, the Spranger types of men seem altogether too broad to specify how one's value orientations are manifested in a given interpersonal situation. The Study of Values is therefore not likely to be effective for empirical studies of interpersonal behavior.

Allport (1961) stated that the only two approaches to values that are worthwhile to mention are his own and that of Morris (1956). The latter approach is based on the concept of "Ways to Live," that is, how one would like to live. Morris developed 13 paragraph statements of different ways to live, primarily based on leading world ideologies. According to an analysis by Morris, these 13 ways to live yield five factors: (a) social restraint and self-control, (b) enjoyment and progress in action, (c) withdrawal and self-sufficiency, (d) receptivity and sympathetic concerns, and (e) self-indulgence.

The actual measure of Ways to Live requires a respondent to rate each of 13 "value orientations" towards the world on a scale of one (I dislike it very much) to seven (I like it very much). This concept of value is, therefore, more similar to interests and preferences than evaluative dimensions such as desirable, appropriate, good, etc. If Morris' "ways" were responded to in terms of ideal ways to live, his value concept would be more unique.

Each value orientation in Ways to Live is represented as a paragraph of several sentences. As Gorlow and Barocas (1965) point out, however, the

descriptive paragraphs are "exceedingly complex" (p. 271). They feel that requiring a respondent to give one response to each complex of statements, e.g., Way One contains 10 descriptive sentences, is unrealistic. Alternatively, Gorlow and Barocas prepared 63 simple statements that could be derived from the 13 complex paragraphs. They then factor analyzed responses of 50 subjects into categories (factors) according to how they would like to live (via a nine-step Q-sort). The results showed six interpretable clusters of individuals.

The above procedure was performed on a different population by the same researchers (Gorlow & Barocas, 1964). Again using 50 subjects, six interpretable clusters of individuals were obtained by factor analyzing their Q-sort responses to the 63 value statements. While this approach had the possibility of empirically validating or modifying the Morris value scheme, certain methodological features require attention. First, subjects, as opposed to value statements, were factored into clusters. Apparently, Gorlow and Noll (1967) were more interested in types of people than dimensions of values. In any case, using 50 subjects to analyze 63 statements is entirely unstable. A rule of thumb suggesting five individuals for every variable in the factor analysis was greatly violated; see Nunnally (1967) for a discussion of sample size in factor analysis and other multivariate techniques.

A general criticism of the Morris "Ways to Live" value measurement as well as the studies by Gorlow and Barocas reported above is that respondents are asked to indicate how they *would like* to live. This type of response framework seems more a measure of motives (what is desired) as opposed to values according to the definition suggested at the start of this paper (what is desirable). Asking subjects to respond to a Q-sort of the 13 value orientations or to a list of the many single statements in terms of the latter framework would more closely reflect the uniqueness of a concept of values. However, the problem of overly general statements of Ways to Live still remains. As Gorlow and Noll (1967) state:

It is worth noting, however, that the separate ideologies [Ways to Live] are exceedingly complex and abstract and appear to be difficult to relate to behavior because of this abstraction (p. 261).

Since the present paper is concerned with interpersonal behavior, the Ways to Live instrument does not seem to relate to a specific interpersonal situation.

Attempting to identify a set of empirically derived values which would be less abstract than the Morris values, Gorlow and Noll (1967) had individuals generate a set of value lists based on three frameworks: (a) sources of meaning in life, (b) goals in life, and (c) sources of pleasure in life. The statements that were generated resulted in a final set of 75 "nonoverlapping, clearly stated values, each of which was cast into infinitive form, such as 'to be loved,' 'to direct others,' 'to understand others,' 'to be useful,' etc." This set of

statements was administered to 112 subjects who were instructed to Q-sort (13 step) the statements according to pile one, "of lowest value to you." A factor analysis extracted eight interpretable factors: Affiliative-Romantic, Status-Security Valuer, Intellectual Humanist, Family Valuer, the Rugged Individualist Factor, the Undemanding Passive Group, the Boy Scout and Don Juan.

The research of Gorlow and Noll presents a useful approach to empirically derive a set of values. However, certain details in their research created limitations on developing a "pure" set of values. To begin with, subjects who generated the value statements responded to three different value frameworks: sources of meaning in life, goals, and sources of pleasure. The earlier discussion attempted to suggest that the unsystematic approach to the study of values in the social sciences partly derives from a failure to differentiate a concept of values from several other conventional concepts. The three frameworks of Gorlow and Noll appear to confound greatly a definite concept of values. In addition, asking subjects to respond to the set of 75 statements via the *value* of the statement to the person does not help to distinguish which of many concepts is actually being measured.

From the results of the above study, it is not clear if the eight factors are any less abstract than Morris' Ways to Live. The eight factors would probably seem less abstract if the generation of statements and the mode of responding to the statements followed from a specific theory and definition of values, as a unique concept. Such a methodology would certainly enhance the ability to relate the factors to specific behavioral situations, e.g., interpersonal behavior. The fact that 112 subjects responded to 75 variables for the factor analysis also raises some questions as to the stability and generality of the extracted factors (for reasons presented earlier).

While the Allport, *et al.* Study of Values and the Morris Ways to Live have received the most attention in the literature, other listings of values have been proposed and researched. Hunt (1935) sought to measure "the relative value of certain ideals." Taking from an extended list of ideals cited in Charters' "The Teaching of Ideals" (1928), Hunt modified a set of 76 ideals and grouped them into 17 categories. The titles of these categories are: Cheerfulness, Cleanliness, Cooperation, Courage, Courtesy, Dependability, Effectiveness, Friendliness, Good Sportmanship, Honesty, Initiative, Obedience, Openmindedness, Respect, Reverence, Self-control, and Thrift. An individual's response to these categories consisted of rank-ordering the ideals according to how important the individual considers them to be.

The two most impressive aspects of Hunt's research are that, (1) values were defined in terms of ideals (a concept of the desirable), and (2) the actual ideals utilized in the study are reasonably concrete in their connection

to behavior, i.e., the ideals represent how one ought to behave, identical to Rokeach's concept of instrumental values to be discussed shortly. It seems then that the ideals uncovered by Hunt show great promise for value investigations into interpersonal behavior.

A test of values was developed by Woodruff (1948) and has been applied to investigate the relationship between values and attitudes. Woodruff and DiVesta (1948) define a value as, "a generalized condition of living which the individual feels has an important effect on his well-being" (p. 645). The actual test, *A Study of Choices*, consists of 24 values for which the respondent is asked to indicate on a scale the extent that each value is important to him. A sample set of values is as follows: Intellectual Conversation, Civic Political Power, Many Social Friends, Security for Many, Family Life, Church Activity, Dominating Personality, and Pure Excitement.

The above set of values shows the diversity of Woodruff's test. At the same time, it seems that the definition of a value is so general, i.e., a generalized condition of living, that it subsumes many different types of social science concepts. These include: affective qualities (Pure Excitement), personality dispositions (Dominating Personality), social structure (Civic Political Power), and social skills (Intellectual Conversation, Social Ease, and Poise). While a factor analysis of the 24 values may certainly facilitate interpretation, on the surface at least, the values appear to be a mixture of concepts. Furthermore, the definition of value as well as the particular value statements, seem too general to relate directly to interpersonal behavior, e.g., Church Activity, Civic Political Power. Therefore, the Woodruff test of values is not expected to be especially useful for present purposes.

A study by Smith (1949) investigated the relationship between personal values and political attitudes. Values were defined as, "highly general attitudes that define a person's orientation toward life in terms of the things he deems most important." Using this frame of reference, Smith interviewed a considerable sample of citizens and coded their responses into 16 value classifications. (The development of this classification was not discussed.) The value classification included the following: Economic Security, Home and Family Life, Liberty and Freedom, World Peace, Education, Religion, Decency and Morality, and Being a Good Citizen.

While the methodology of coding values from interview responses is certainly intriguing, the nature of Smith's interviews and the actual classifications limit the usefulness of this particular study for investigating values in interpersonal behavior. First, the interviewer's questions to the respondent were not standardized and permitted the probing of responses by appealing to interests as opposed to the evaluative dimensions of values. For example, if the respondent hesitated, the interviewer would ask, "What are you most

interested in—what things do you care about most?" This type of questioning could confound the resulting responses with other concepts. Also, the value classification scheme contained several exceedingly general categories, e.g., World Peace, Education, Religion, Health. It is not very clear how these general "value orientations" would become manifested in specific interpersonal settings. In addition, as in the case of the Woodruff (1948) study, the 16 value categories seem to represent terminal values in contrast to instrumental values.

Catton (1954) sought to measure what he termed "infinite" values. By infinite, Catton refers to something that is utterly desirable. Eighteen Protestant ministers responded to a mailing asking for a list of values that they thought were of infinite worth to human beings. From their responses, Catton derived "six abstract values, which seemed to subsume nearly everything suggested by the respondents." The six classes of infinite values are: Human life itself, Man's creative achievements, Wholesome cooperation with our fellowmen for a happier life for all, Worship of God and acceptance of God's will, Fullest development of the moral character of mankind, and Fullest development of human intelligence and human abilities. The relative values of an individual were measured by three techniques: paired comparison (15 pairs in all), rank-orderings, and selection of one of the six infinite values. However, the criticisms of this approach for the current purposes are two-fold. First, the concept of values is defined rather loosely, i.e., in relation to "worth." Second, the actual classification of infinite values is considerably general and abstract, e.g., Human Life Itself. For reasons presented earlier, such a value scheme does not lend itself to the interpersonal level of analysis.

A study by Scott (1959) attempted to assess the moral ideals of individuals. Scott's concept of value is as follows: "A personal value or moral ideal, has been defined as a particular individual's concept of an ideal state of affairs or relations among people which he uses to assess the 'goodness' or 'badness,' the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of actual relations which he observes" (p. 301).

The definition of personal values or moral ideals advanced by Scott is sensitive to the concern for developing a unique value concept (personal values will be considered as identical to moral ideals; desirability being viewed as analogous to the good-bad dimension, i.e., what is seen as good and what is seen as bad determines if various means or ends are seen as desirable or not). Using interview and open questionnaire methodologies, Scott attempted to direct respondents to describe in value terms (on the good-bad, right-wrong dimension), "What is it about any person that makes him good?" and "What kinds of things about a person would make him especially bad?" These questions were followed by, "Why would you say that is good (or bad)?" According to the responses of the first 50 interviews, Scott developed a classification

scheme of 18 moral ideals. These are as follows: Self-control, Religiousness, Hard Work, Honesty, Intelligence, Humility, Genuineness, Happiness, Loyalty, Fairness, Dependability, Love of People, Social Skills, Friendliness, Integrity, Individual Dignity, Respect for Authority, and Generosity.

These moral ideals seem somewhat similar to the ideals studied by Hunt (1935). They tend to have a much less abstract quality than several of the other value classifications which have been reviewed. In the same vein, the classification by Scott appears to be reflective of instrumental values, values that refer to how one ought to behave and hence, such values are most likely to be relevant and useful to interpersonal situations.

An individual's interview or questionnaire response was assessed by either the presence or absence of each of the 18 moral ideals. While a formal factor analysis was not performed, a chi-squared analysis of statistical significance among the moral ideals suggested a set of five clusters (Scott considered tetrachoric correlations to be over-assuming for the open-question measure). Four main clusters were labeled as follows (the fourth and fifth clusters were given the same label): (1) "individual integrity," included the moral ideals of honesty and genuineness, (2) "trustworthiness," included intelligence and dependability, (3) "religiousness and self-control," suggested an inhibitive orientation, and (4) "people orientation," included love of people, friendliness, and happiness.

The four clusters labeled by Scott indicate how a list of several values can be simplified to a few main "value orientations." In particular, such an analysis is quite helpful in comprehending the underlying dimensions of any value list. While the four labeled clusters seem to be fairly independent (i.e., different), a rigorous factor analysis would be necessary to substantiate such an empirical value structure. However, the manner in which Scott defined personal values, the particular value list he endorsed, and the use of cluster analysis points toward a feasible approach to studying values in interpersonal settings.

Rettig and Pasamanick (1959) studied the changes in moral values among college students. They defined "moral judgments" as, "the individual's overt or covert evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of an event" (p. 856). As such, Rettig and Pasamanick define a concept of values that is fairly compatible with the notion of what is desirable (rightness and wrongness, goodness and badness can be viewed as dimensions which determine desirability).

The measurement of moral values was made with a questionnaire of 50 behaviors for which the respondent is asked to indicate on a 10-point scale an evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of the acts or situations. A sample of the behaviors is as follows: killing a person in defense of one's own life; having sex relations while unmarried; betting on horse races; not giving to charity when able; buying bootleg liquor under prohibition law; using profane or blasphemous speech; and disbelieving in God.

The above sample of behaviors which respondents are asked to evaluate is considerably varied. While the behaviors are reasonably specific as stated, they typically relate to a diversity of situations and therefore it is not clear how a person's responses to these varied situations would carry over to his evaluative responses in an *interpersonal* situation. Given these comments, it is not surprising that the factor analysis performed by Rettig and Pasamanick of 489 students evaluating the 50 items, resulted in very general factors. The six extracted factors were labeled as follows: basic morality (intrinsic), religious moral value, family maintenance, puritanical morality (conventional), pre-delinquent morality, and economic morality. The diversity of items that compose the factors requires such general labels. Consequently, the type of questionnaire used by Rettig and Pasamanick will probably not be useful for furthering the study of values in interpersonal settings.

Rokeach (1969, 1970) has developed a concept of values which has served as a referent throughout the foregoing literature review. As will be recalled, Rokeach defined values as, "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence" (Rokeach, 1969, p. 160). This concept of preferable modes of conduct and end-states is analogous to the notion of what are desirable ends and means, i.e., what one ought to strive for, and how one ought to strive for it. Rokeach's distinction of terminal values and instrumental values reflects the ends-means considerations.

Rokeach presents a set of 18 instrumental values and 18 terminal values to operationalize his value concepts. The instrumental values are as follows: Honest, Broadminded, Loving, Intellectual, Cheerful, Obedient, Helpful, Ambitious, Logical, Responsible, Forgiving, Polite, Clean, Courageous, Independent, Self-controlled, Capable, and Imaginative. The terminal values are: Wisdom, Self-respect, Pleasure, Mature Love, True Friendship, Social Recognition, A World of Peace, A World of Beauty, Salvation, National Security, Equality, Inner Harmony, A Comfortable Life, Happiness, Family Security, An Exciting Life, A Sense of Accomplishment, and Freedom.

An inspection of the instrumental values reveals their marked similarity to Hunt's set of 17 ideals (Hunt, 1935), and Scott's list of 18 moral ideals (Scott, 1959). With regard to the terminal values, it seems that most of the researched values that have been considered too abstract for the present focus towards interpersonal behavior would tend to fit into this category of values. For example, Smith's personal values of World Peace and Comforts of Life are identical to Rokeach's terminal values (Smith, 1949). Also, certain values from Catton (1954) and from Woodruff and DiVesta (1948) can be viewed as terminal values.

The actual method by which Rokeach's value concepts are measured consists of a rank-ordering of either instrumental or terminal values. The

basis for the ranking is how important the stated values are to the person. This framework may somewhat confound what is actually being assessed, i.e., "importance of values" can be interpreted in several different ways, e.g., important interests, goals, wants, etc. Rokeach's method would be more suited for the present purposes of deriving a unique concept of value, if the rank-ordering of instrumental values would be based on the explicit framework of which values are seen as more desirable or ideal modes of conduct or end-states.

Bales (1970) presents a comprehensive factor analysis of what he terms "value statements." Bales defines a value statement as, "a statement of an existing norm, or a proposal for a new norm." The context of this norm is primarily viewed in a small group situation.

The sources of items that went into the factor analysis are considerably varied. Bales used items from (a) previous remarks made by subjects, (b) the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values, (c) Morris' Ways to Live, (d) the F-Scale and other scales from the Authoritarian Personality, (e) Henry Murray's list of sentiments associated with personality needs, (f) the Thurstone Temperament Schedule, (g) Levinson and Huffman's Traditional Family Ideology Scale, (h) the Couch-Goodrich Militant Radicalism Scale, (i) Cattell's Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, and several other scales and statements by associates (see Bales, 1970, for the references to these and other scales).

An inspection of the varied scales which were the source of the final set of 252 items indicates that an explicit and unique concept of values has not been applied. Bales' analysis confounds personality traits, dispositions and needs, with interests, ideologies and militant orientations. The four factors that were found in the study are: Acceptance of Authority, Need-Determined Expression versus Value-Determined Restraint, Equalitarianism and Individualism. While the factor labels are interesting, they do not represent the enormous diversity of the items composing the factors.

Gordon (1960) developed a self-report, forced-choice instrument to measure six interpersonal values: Support (being treated with understanding), Conformity (following regulations closely), Recognition (being looked up to and admired), Independence (having the right to do whatever one wants to do), Benevolence (doing things for other people), and Leadership (having authority or being in charge of other people). An individual obtains a score for each value by indicating on 30 triads of items, which item has the most and which item has the least importance to the respondent. The items within each triad were balanced on a social desirability index to counteract this type of response bias. While the Gordon instrument assesses the "importance" of items to the individual as opposed to whether the various items "should be" important, i.e., evaluative dimension, some of the instrumental values stated by Rokeach and the ideals presented by Hunt and by Scott bear some similarity

to the interpersonal values researched by Gordon, e.g., independence, benevolence. It is notable that Gordon attempted to control for the social desirability response bias which is likely to operate with the assessment of such a socially evaluative issue as values (Edwards, 1953, 1957).

A recent effort to develop an instrument which takes into account some of the foregoing discussion is presented by Kilmann (1972, 1975). A projective instrument entitled the "Kilmann Insight Test" was developed to measure the Interpersonal Value Constructs of individuals, defined as: the mental categories through which an individual perceives and interprets the desirable and undesirable features of interpersonal behavior. The term "construct" was borrowed from the work of Kelly (1955) who used the term to refer to an idea or abstraction that has a dichotomous nature. For example, good-bad is a construct. Considering interpersonal values, honest-dishonest, helpful-unhelpful, intellectual-nonintellectual, etc., can be viewed as constructs. According to this definition, an individual utilizes his interpersonal value constructs whenever he considers the evaluative aspects of an interpersonal situation, especially when the situation contains ambiguities or is subject to different interpretations.

The basic form of the insight test was based on the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a projective test first developed by Murray (1938). The research by McClelland, Atkinson, and their associates (McClelland, *et al.*, 1953; Atkinson, 1958; McClelland, 1961) suggested the usefulness of a picture stimulus to elicit various cognitive processes. In particular, having an individual react to a series of pictures of interpersonal behavior is seen to simulate the use of interpersonal value constructs in actual situations. Instead of a respondent's writing a story to each picture and then having the story coded for various interpersonal value constructs (analogous to scoring TAT stories for individual motives), a specific set of constructs were predetermined. These were developed by taking the 18 instrumental values of Rokeach and expressing them in terms of nouns to emphasize the bipolar notion of a construct (Kelly, 1955). For example, the honest-dishonest construct was stated as "honesty." The same was done for the other values.

The instructions for the insight test request a respondent to indicate on a seven-point scale, the extent that the respondent sees each "concern" to be relevant to each of six pictures of interpersonal behavior. The respondent is asked to indicate his insight by "clearly distinguishing" the relevance of the listed concerns (in actuality, a list of 18 interpersonal value constructs). The test is presented as one of insight for two basic reasons. First, the actual nature of the test is hidden from the respondent and therefore, certain social desirability and other distortion or response biases are minimized, i.e., the test is meant to assess values as they are applied, it is not meant to assess how an individual wishes to appear to himself or to others. Second, the notion of an

insight test is intended to motivate respondents to discriminate in their use of constructs. In essence, the basic intention of the test with respect to the concept of values being assessed may be stated: the more a particular interpersonal value is significant to an individual, i.e., the more the individual believes that one ought to behave or act in a certain manner, the more the individual's cognitive processes will be organized to construe interpersonal phenomena via a set of constructs reflective of that value, and the more likely is the individual to perceive a value construct, e.g., honesty, as being a relevant "concern" in an ambiguous interpersonal situation.

To investigate the underlying dimensions of the interpersonal value constructs as was done in the other value studies reported earlier, a factor analysis of individual responses to the test was performed (Kilmann, 1975). A two-factor solution was chosen since it had the most internal consistency of factors and the lowest average intercorrelations of any other solution (alpha coefficient of internal consistency = .75; intercorrelation =  $-.12$ ). Factor 1 was labeled "Good Fellowship versus Functional Task Activity." The positive loadings on this factor which comprise the first side of the dimension were: Forgivingness, Affection, Cheerfulness, Helpfulness, and Broadmindedness. The negative loadings on Factor 1 which comprise the latter side of the dimension, i.e., Functional Task Activity, were: Logic, Intellect, Capability, Orderliness, and Responsibility. Factor 2 was labeled "Interpersonal Restraint versus Boldness." The positive loadings which made up the restraint side of the dimension were: Politeness, Self-control, and Obedience. The negative loadings for this factor describe the boldness side of the dimension. These were: Courage, Imagination, Honesty, and Independence.

Although the value list included in the factor analysis of the test was derived from the specific list of Rokeach (which is quite similar to the lists by Hunt and Scott), the four poles of the two new factors bear several similarities to factors found with the other value lists. For example, the Good Fellowship pole of Factor 1 is somewhat analogous to: Morris' factor of Receptivity and Sympathetic Concern; Gorlow and Noll's Affiliative-Romantic; and Bales' Equalitarianism. Factor 1's Functional Task Activity has certain similarities to Gorlow and Noll's Intellectual Humanist. The pole of Restraint on Factor 2 is reflected in: Morris' Social Restraint and Self-control factor; Gorlow and Noll's Undemanding Passive Group; and Bales' Acceptance of Authority. Furthermore, the Boldness pole of Factor 2 is represented in: Gorlow and Noll's Rugged Individualist; and Bales' Individualism. While Scott (1950) did not perform a quantitative factor analysis on his value list, his qualitative cluster analysis is exceedingly appropriate to this discussion because of the marked similarity between his value list and the test's value list. Scott's four clusters were: People Orientation (affection, forgivingness),

Trustworthiness (responsibility, capability), Religiousness and Self-control (obedience, self-control), and Individual Integrity (honesty, courage).

A major issue raised in the above comparison of value dimensions resulting from factor analyses of value lists, is whether certain value dimensions are strictly independent of one another or if they are actually opposed to one another on a single dimension. The factor analysis of the insight test resulted in two factors which had strong positive and negative loadings on each factor. And even though notions of fellowship or people-oriented concerns have often been found to be independent from task-oriented concerns (Bales, 1959; Bass, 1960; Hare, 1962), responses to the insight test suggest that the individual who is strongly oriented to Good Fellowship constructs tends at the same time to be oriented away from Functional Task Activity constructs. Perhaps the dimensions of Factor 1 yield the much discussed trade-offs, compromises, and conflicts of intra-individual applications of values (Rokeach, 1969). Similarly, Factor 2 on the insight test describes the trade-off between restraint and boldness as constructs. But the factor analyses of the other value lists reported do not portray these conflicts. Rather the latter present a larger set of independent uni-directional value items and labels.

A study by Kilmann (1975) found that a factor analysis of Rokeach's values, as measured by the self-report method, resulted in virtually the same factor *structure* as the insight test, i.e., the similarity of the items that composed the positive and negative loadings of each factor. However, the correlations between the Rokeach self-report factor scores and the insight test's projective factor scores were insignificant. Thus, a comparison of factor structures from different instruments may also be contaminated by the different psychological dynamics being tapped by the instruments. The self-reports seem to assess the conscious, verbal level of awareness of a person's own values (perhaps with various response distortions), while the projective assessment might tap the more unconscious aspects of interpersonal values (Murstein, 1965). Certainly, further research is required to understand better the basis for different factor structures of values, and to what extent they may be affected by method variance (Campbell & Fiske, 1967) or other manifestations of the measurement process.

While the insight test represents a potentially useful approach to the study of interpersonal values, its projective assessment creates an additional problem: the relationships between an individual's interpersonal value constructs and his behavior in interpersonal settings is more indirect than self-reports and behavior. Kilmann (1974) found several significant relationships between individuals' interpersonal value constructs and behavior in sensitivity training groups but had difficulty in suggesting the bases of the relationships, i.e., how does an individual's projection of certain interpersonal value con-

structs affect the way he develops mutual respect and attraction with other individuals, especially when the projection of constructs is largely an unconscious process? Clearly, much more research is needed to explore the relationship between interpersonal values and behavior as well as different methods of measuring these values for individuals.

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Since the focus of the present paper is on values in relation to interpersonal behavior, the foregoing review has emphasized a concept of values that is unique and useful to the area of investigation. Specifically, by "unique" is meant whether the concept of values being proposed is defined vis-à-vis evaluative dimensions, i.e., desirable-undesirable, appropriate-inappropriate, good-bad, etc., or if the concept is defined similarly to related concepts, e.g., needs, interests, preferences, etc., or is a mixed combination of various concepts. While researchers may define their concept of values a particular way, the critical issue is how the value is operationalized in the measurement process. That is, in what framework are individuals asked to respond to some list of values, by what is desirable or by what interests them? The former is considered a unique value focus while the latter is not.

Whether the concept of values is expected to be "useful" for empirical research on values in interpersonal settings depends on the concreteness of the list of values to which individuals respond in a values assessment. In particular, value lists which are more in line with instrumental values (specific modes of behavior) are more likely to be useful for research purposes in the interpersonal realm than value lists which represent terminal values (abstract goals or end-states of behavior). Thus, the usefulness of a concept of values involves the manner in which the initial set of values was generated, i.e., how general versus specific the items are and whether the items reflect means or ends of behavior.

Fig. 1 summarizes the conclusions in this paper by sorting the 14 basic studies that were reviewed into one of four categories. These categories result from a two-by-two matrix defined by the two dimensions of concern just discussed: whether the concept of value presented by the author(s) is unique via the measurement process (values as an evaluative concept or as a related/mixed concept), and/or whether the concept of value is operationalized by a useful (concrete) list of value items (instrumental values versus terminal values). The 14 studies were sorted based on the discussions and critical reviews in this paper and the reader is referred back to these discussions (or to the original articles) to note the definition of values, the value lists, and the measurement process presented by the authors.

As can be seen from Fig. 1, only three studies meet the criteria of being

Uniqueness of Concept Via Measurement Process	Usefulness of Value Items	
	Instrumental Values (Concrete)	Terminal Values (Vague)
Unique/Evaluative Value Concept	Hunt (1935) Scott (1959) Kilmann (1975)	Catton (1954) Rettig & Pasamanick (1959) Bales (1970)
Related/Mixed Value Concept	Gordon (1960) Rokeach (1969)	Allport, <i>et al.</i> (1931, 1951) Van Dusen, <i>et al.</i> (1939) Woodruff & DiVesta (1948) Smith (1949) Morris (1956) Gorlow & Noll (1967)

FIG. 1. Classification of selected value literature according to unique/useful concepts of interpersonal behavior

both unique and useful concepts of values. These are the studies by Hunt (1935), Scott (1959), and Kilmann (1975). The plurality of studies were categorized as neither unique nor useful (Allport & Vernon, 1931; Allport, *et al.*, 1951; Van Dusen, *et al.*, 1939; Woodruff & DiVesta, 1948; Smith, 1949; Morris, 1956; Gorlow & Noll, 1967). The other studies were mixed as either not unique but useful (Gordon, 1960; Rokeach, 1969) or unique but not useful (Catton, 1954; Rettig & Pasamanick, 1959; Bales, 1970).

In conclusion, to facilitate the development of a unique value focus which is usefully tied to a specific area of study, e.g., interpersonal behavior, it is recommended that an explicit conceptual framework and definition of value be used to guide all stages of instrument development in conjunction with a consistent and concrete view of the specified phenomenon. This requires considerable research in using the instrument to understand better what factor structure is operating, how the instrument relates to others that are also attempting to assess a similar concept, and most importantly, how the concept relates to actual behavior. Only then can a measure of values hope to enhance our knowledge of value processes in behavioral situations. The un-systematic development of value research in the social sciences has certainly been affected by not dealing specifically with these issues.

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Accepted May 27, 1981.